

INSIGHT

IDEAS • OPINION • COMMENTARY

SECTION



Sunday, December 9, 2007

goes counter to what we've been telling people: Be careful about your debt."

Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., on President Bush's plan to help troubled homeowners reset their mortgage rates

Bali needs to know — an China go green?

By Robert Collier

As international diplomats gather in Bali to try to begin negotiating a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol, their toughest challenge is how to deal with China's fast rise as the world's leading emitter of greenhouse gases.

The talks, which began Dec. 3 and continue until Dec. 14, no longer are likely to be based on cutting emissions. The Bush administration refuses to consider such a pact unless China does so and China says wealthy nations must go first. Not only understood, however, are the underlying elements behind the conflict — the degree to which China has become the central battleground of global warming, and the reasons why China's government cannot make any concessions to U.S. demands.

According to several international studies in recent months, China's emissions have not only surpassed the U.S. level, but also are growing at a rate that far outpaces wealthy nations' capacity to reduce theirs. Even if China met its own targets to reduce energy intensity (consumption per unit of economic output), its emissions would increase by about 2.5 billion metric tons over the next five years, the data show. This total is larger than the 1.1 billion tons of reductions imposed by the Kyoto protocol on developed nations, including the United States, which since withdrew from the treaty.

But Beijing's leaders are not best stubborn or in denial. To the contrary, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao seem much more aware of the global warming problem than President Bush or any members of Congress. The real sticking point is that Beijing's top leadership seems largely incapable of complying with any significant cutback commitments. Amid China's explosive economic growth of recent years, the Communist government has lost much political and regulatory ground that it has been unable to force provincial and municipal authorities to obey environmental laws. Despite its image abroad as an all-powerful dictatorship, the government desperately needs regulatory clout.

For example, the central government has made high-profile pledges to reduce energy intensity by 20 percent annually and to punish local officials who fail to comply, but many local authorities have blithely ignored Beijing, continuing to pursue economic growth at all costs. As a result, the country cut its energy intensity by 1.3 percent last year and by 3 percent in the first nine months of this year, according to official statistics — which are believed to be

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MORTGAGE MELTDOWN

INTEREST RATE 'FREEZE' — THE REAL STORY IS FRAUD

Securitization

At the heart of the cheap credit binge was a process known as securitization, where Wall Street began to buy up subprime mortgages and package them as mortgage-backed securities to sell to investors.

Borrowers

Mortgage broker

Subprime mortgage lender

2

More mortgage brokers jumped into the subprime business, many of them earning six-figure incomes on high fees paid for by homeowners' subprime loans.

3

Big companies offering subprime mortgages solicited Wall Street money. After making a home loan, they quickly sold it to packagers, such as investment banks, for more profits.

Structured finance

A financial innovation called structured finance provided Wall Street a way to divide subprime mortgage-backed securities into tranches (French for slices.) The tranches allowed the risk of a loan pool to be parceled out to various investors. Investors who purchased bonds in the securities received a portion of the mortgage payments in the pool.


Top-level tranches contain the highest-quality, but lowest-paying, bonds. Even though a mortgage-backed security may be funded from a pool containing subprime loans, the top tranches can have investment-grade status of triple-A rated bonds because they are paid first from the pool.

The lowest-level tranches contain the riskiest, highest-paying bonds. They get a low rating and are paid off after the double- and triple-A rated bonds are paid.

1

Borrowers, many first-time homebuyers or individuals wanting to refinance, turned to subprime loans.

New mortgage loans by year



4

Wall Street investment banks began pooling risky, subprime loans that did not meet the standards of government-sponsored agencies such as Fannie Mae and sold them as "private label" securities.


Pool of subprime loans

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Rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's helped investment banks structure the mortgage-backed securities to get the best possible bond ratings, earning healthy fees in the process, and making them attractive to investors, including mutual and pension funds.

Rating agency

Loan pool



Mortgage-backed security

Investor

6

Investors worldwide gobbled up the securities.

Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association; HSH Associates; Federal Housing Finance Board; LoanPerformance, a First American Co.

The Denver Post

Bankers pay lip service to families while scurrying to avert suits, prison

By Sean Olender

New proposals to ease our great mortgage meltdown keep rolling in. First the Treasury Department urged the creation of a new fund that would buy risky mortgage bonds as a tactic to hide what those bonds were really worth. (Not much.) Then the idea was to use Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy the risky loans, even if it was clear that U.S. taxpayers would eventually be stuck with the bill. But that plan went south after Fannie suffered a new accounting scandal, and Freddie's existing loan losses shot up more than expected.

Now, just unveiled Thursday, comes the "freeze," the brainchild of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. It sounds good: For five years, mortgage lenders will freeze interest rates on a limited number of "teaser" subprime loans. Other homeowners facing foreclosure will be offered assistance from the Federal Housing Administration.

But unfortunately, the "freeze" is just another fraud — and like the other bailout proposals, it has nothing to do with U.S. house prices, with "working families," keeping people in their homes or any of that nonsense.

The sole goal of the freeze is to prevent owners of mortgage-backed securities, many of them foreigners, from suing U.S. banks and forcing them to buy back worthless mortgage securities at face value — right now almost 10 times their market worth.

The ticking time bomb in the U.S. banking system is not resetting subprime mortgage rates. The real problem is the contractual ability of investors in mortgage bonds to require banks to buy back the loans at face value if there was fraud in the origination process.

And, to be sure, fraud is everywhere. It's in the loan application documents, and it's in the appraisals. There are e-mails and memos floating around showing that many people in banks, investment banks and appraisal companies — all the way up to senior management — knew about it.

I can hear the hum of shredders working overtime, and maybe that is the new "hot" industry to invest in. There are lots of people who would like to muzzle subpoena-happy New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo to buy time and make this all go away. Cuomo is just inches from getting what he needs to start putting a lot of people in prison. I bet some

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Interest rate 'freeze' — real story is fraud

► **OLENDER**
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People are trying right now to make him an offer "he can't refuse."

Despite Thursday's ballyhooed new deal with mortgage lenders, does anyone really think that it can ultimately stop fraud lawsuits by mortgage bond investors, many of them spread out across the globe?

The catastrophic consequences of bond investors forcing originators to buy back loans at face value are beyond the current media discussion. The loans at issue dwarf the capital available at the largest U.S. banks combined, and investor lawsuits would raise causing even the largest U.S. banks to fail, resulting in massive taxpayer-funded bailouts of Fannie and Freddie, and even FDIC.

The problem isn't just subprime loans. It is the entire mortgage market. As home prices fall, defaults will rise sharply — period. And so will the patience of mortgage bondholders. Different classes of mortgage bonds from various risk pools are owned by different central banks, funds, pensions and investors all over the world. Even your pension or 401(k) might have some of these bonds in it.

Perhaps some U.S. government department can make veiled threats to foreign countries to suggest they will suffer unpleasant consequences if their largest holders (central banks and investment funds) don't go along with the plan, but how could it be possible to strong-arm everyone?

What would be prudent and logical is for the banks that sold

this toxic waste to buy it back and for a lot of people to go to prison. If they knew about the fraud, they should have to buy the bonds back. The time to look into this is before the shredders have worked their magic — not five years from now.

Those selling the "freeze" have suggested that mortgage-backed securities investors will benefit because they lose more with rising foreclosures. But with fast-depreciating collateral, the last thing investors in mortgage bonds ought to do is put off foreclosures. Rate freezes are at best a tool for delaying the inevitable foreclosures when even the most optimistic forecasters expect home prices to fall. In October, Goldman Sachs issued a report forecasting an incredible 35 to 40 percent drop in California home prices in the coming few years. To minimize losses, a mortgage bondholder would obviously be better off foreclosing on a home before prices plunge.

The goal of the freeze may be to delay bond investors from suing by putting off the big foreclosure wave for several years. But it may also be to stop bond investors from suing. If the investors agreed to loan modifications with the "real" wage and asset information from refinancing borrowers, mortgage originators and bundlers would have an excuse once the foreclosure occurred. They could say, "Fraud? What fraud? You knew the borrower's real income and asset information later when he refinanced!"

The key is to refinance borrowers whose current loans involved fraud in the origination process. And I assure you it was a minority of borrowers whose loans didn't

involve fraud.

The government is trying to accomplish wide-scale refinancing by tricking bond investors, or by tricking U.S. taxpayers. Guess who will foot the bill now that the FHA is entering the fray?

Ultimately, the people in these secret Paulson meetings were probably less worried about saving the mortgage market than with saving themselves. Some might be looking at prison time.

As chief of Goldman Sachs, Paulson was involved, to degrees as yet unrevealed, in the mortgage securitization process during the halcyon days of mortgage fraud from 2004 to 2006.

Paulson became the U.S. Treasury secretary on July 10, 2006, after the extent of the debacle was coming into focus for those in the know. Goldman Sachs achieved recent accolades in the markets for having bet heavily against the housing market, while Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Bear Sterns, Merrill Lynch and others got hammered for failing to time the end of the credit bubble.

Goldman Sachs is the only major investment bank in the United States that has emerged as yet unscathed from this debacle. The success of its strategy must have resulted from fairly substantial bets against housing, mortgage banking and related industries, which also means that Goldman Sachs saw this coming at the same time they were bundling and selling these loans.

If a mortgage bond investor sues Goldman Sachs to force the institution to buy back loans, could Paulson be forced to testify as to whether Goldman Sachs knew or had reason to know about fraud in the origination process of

the loans it was bundling?

It is truly amazing that right now everyone in the country is deferring to Paulson and the heads of Countrywide, JPMorgan, Bank of America and others as the best group to work out a solution to this problem. No one is talking about the fact that these people created the problem and profited to the tune of hundreds of billions of dollars from it.

I suspect that such a group first sat down and tried to figure out how to protect their financial interests and avoid criminal liability. And then when they agreed on the plan, they decided to sell it as "helping working families stay in their homes." That's why these meetings were secret, and reporters and the public weren't invited.

The next time that Paulson is before the Senate Finance Committee, instead of asking, "How much money do you think we should give your banking buddies?" I'd like to see New York Sen. Chuck Schumer ask him what he knew about this staggering fraud at the time he was chief of Goldman Sachs.

The Goldman report in October suggests that rampant investor demand is to blame for origination fraud — even though these investors were misled by high credit ratings from bond rating agencies being paid billions by the U.S. investment banks, like Goldman, that were selling the bundled mortgages.

This logic is like saying shoppers seeking bargain-priced soup encourage the grocery store owner to steal it. I mean, we're talking about criminal fraud here. We are on the cusp of a mammoth financial crisis, and the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury are trying to limit the liability of their banking friends under the guise of trying to help borrowers. At stake is nothing short of the continued existence of the U.S. banking system.

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Cambodia rising from Khmer Rouge disaster

► **CAMBODIA**
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Sihanoukville, it may have come at the expense of what one Asian magazine last month called the brutality of evictions of local residents that have reached "alarming levels."

Bottom line:

The downsides, and the challenges they pose, are no secret. Prime Minister Hun Sen, at an investor conference last month, said as much. It's the *implementation* of needed reforms that is more problematic. Apart from vested interests, traditions and the universal instinct to take short cuts, illegal and otherwise, Cambodian society has the added burden that its most fundamental structures — governance, law, administration, education — were utterly destroyed in Year Zero, along with trust. All of which have to be painfully rebuilt. So long as the Asian economic tide continues to rise, Cambodia will probably be lifted along with it. But what if the tide ebbs, and integration gives way to more fierce competition?

As I look at my notes from the trip, peruse various economic and other reports, and pace around thinking about what I saw, heard and read, I can only come up with the vague, unsatisfactory cliché — that the country's future hangs in the balance.

But if there's any justice at all, Cambodia deserves to make it.

Online Resources

Economic and Social

World Bank Reports, web.worldbank.org/kh

Private-sector reports: International Finance Corporation, links.sfgate.com/ZBSL

Labor conditions: International Trade Union Confederation report, September 2007, links.sfgate.com/ZBSM

Agriculture: Oxfam reports and programs, links.sfgate.com/ZBSO

Center for Social Development (Phnom Penh): www.csd-cambodia.org

Womyn's Agenda for Change (Phnom Penh): www.womynsagenda.org
Phnom Penh Post: www.phnompenhpost.com

U.S. relations

Congressional Research Service report, July 2007 (pdf): links.sfgate.com/ZBSP

Khmer Rouge/War Crimes Trials/Khmer Rouge

War Crimes Tribunal ("Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia"): www.eccc.gov.kh

Cambodia Tribunal Monitor: www.cambodiatribunal.org

Documentation Center of Cambodia: www.dccam.org
Cambodian Genocide Program, Yale University: www.yale.edu/cgp

Beijing lacks clout to curb emissions

► **EMISSIONS**
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marred by the data-fudging of local officials.

"The situation remains extremely bleak, with some work not being properly done," Xie Zhenhua, vice chairman of the powerful National Development and Reform Commission, told a Beijing press conference Nov. 29. Asked about the government's claims that local officials would be judged by their environmental performance, Xie replied, "I know one province that will take action against leaders of selected areas and enterprises if they fail to meet the final energy conservation and emission reduction target."

What's urgently needed to help China go green is a crash program of technical aid, modeled on California's 20-year record of quietly helping Chinese officials learn from the state's own success in setting standards on air quality and energy efficiency that are tighter than those required under federal law.

With virtually no publicity, scientists and specialists from the California Energy Commission, California Environmental Protection Agency, Air Resources Board, Public Utilities Commission, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and the non-profit Energy Foundation of San Francisco have traveled to China to advise the national, provincial and municipal governments. They have set up

pro-conservation electricity rate programs. They have set up

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ANDREW S. ROSS / The Chronicle

Sok Chenda Sophea, a senior adviser to Prime Minister Hun Sen said in an interview that he is "surprised" at his countrymen's "capacity to forgive and forget" America's contribution to Cambodia's pain.

Questions and answers about today's Cambodia

► **Q&A**
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seeks to take the country.

As for the United States, which Chhim also pointed out at one time refused to have any truck with any government associated with the Khmer Rouge, it had a 10-year ban on aid to Cambodia, which it lifted only in February. The largest states is now one of the largest providers of foreign aid to Cambodia, and, according to Ambassador Joseph Mussomeli, considers its relationship with the current Cambodian government "abnormally normal."

Nobody I talked to in Cambodia brought up the idea of financial reparations.

"Many Cambodians would agree with me that no amount of financial reparation is adequate to repay for our losses, our loss of father, mother, sister, brother, child, husband, wife, etcetera," said Theary Seng, executive director of the

and viewed the United States after the B-52 bombing raids ("Operation Menu"). This seems particularly relevant question given the parallel of Vietnam and Cambodia then to Iraq and Iran now. — Ben Vasquez

Q: What is the general attitude toward Americans? We see the media stories about how we are hated in many Muslim countries. Am wondering how those who have had to pick up the pieces feel about us now. — Denise McGrath Wilder, Daly City

Operation Menu was the code name for the 1969-70 U.S. bombing of Cambodia, first aimed at eradicating North Vietnamese sanctuaries inside Cambodia. U.S. forces dropped more than 500,000 tons of bombs on the country.

As a student who had opposed the U.S. incursion into and bombing of Cambodia, U.S. Ambassador Mussomeli, said, "I expected a reservoir of resentment" about among Cambodians today.